University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 30

Issue 1

Article 6

12-19-2022

Foreclosing Asylum: “Neo-Refoulement” and the Ripple Effects of
U.S. Interdiction at Sea
Edgar Cruz
University of Miami School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edgar Cruz, Foreclosing Asylum: “Neo-Refoulement” and the Ripple Effects of U.S. Interdiction at Sea, 30
U. MIA Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 150 (2022)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol30/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

FORECLOSING ASYLUM: “NEO-REFOULEMENT” AND THE RIPPLE
EFFECTS OF U.S. INTERDICTION AT SEA
Edgar Cruz *
ABSTRACT
This Note argues that U.S. interdiction of asylum seekers at sea and
the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program undermine the object and
purpose of international refugee law. The U.S. Government uses both
practices to evade its international obligation of non-refoulement, or nonreturn. Such practices unjustly restrict access to asylum in the U.S. These
policies can be characterized as tools of “neo-refoulement.” Neo-refoulement
is a strategy used to foreclose the possibility of asylum. It allows States parties
to the 1951 Refugee Convention to evade their international obligation to
refrain from returning people to places where they may be at risk of harm.
Section I provides a brief history of the origins and spirit of refugee law.
Section II discusses the Baker cases, which laid the groundwork for enforcing
U.S. interdiction and return practices. Section III discusses Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc., a Supreme Court case that sanctioned those practices.
Section IV discusses how the MPP continues the U.S. Government’s pattern
of neo-refoulement. Section V briefly discusses the MPP’s procedural history
at the time of writing.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2021, history seemed to be repeating itself. Political
instability in Haiti after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse
and other crises left many Haitians “feeling they had no option but to
leave—despite the difficulties they face in fleeing to other countries.” 1
Thousands of Haitians arrived at the Texas border in late September
2021. 2 They raised makeshift encampments under a bridge that
connected Del Rio, Texas, to Mexico’s Ciudad Acuña. 3 Their fate was
uncertain. Many hoped for asylum but to no avail.
By September 24th, border enforcement agencies had cleared
the encampments. 4 Most Haitians were sent back to Haiti under “Title
42 [of the Public Health Service Act], a controversial measure that the
Trump Administration used, citing COVID-19 risk, to expel asylum
seekers before granting them hearings.” 5 Others were sent to border
regions in Mexico to wait for a hearing in immigration court. 6 Only
Jasmine Aguilera, How History Is Repeating Itself for Haitian Migrants Trying to
Enter the U.S., TIME (Sept. 30, 2021, 11:55 AM), https://time.com/6102229/haitianmigrants-us-border-texas.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
1
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some were allowed into the U.S. to make formal asylum claims. 7
During that time, some estimated that the Biden Administration
“expelled more Haitians back to Haiti, without granting them the
opportunity to present asylum claims, than the Trump Administration
did.” 8 This is not the first time the U.S. Government has restricted the
rights of Haitians, and other migrants, to make asylum claims in the
U.S. 9 The U.S. has a history of unjustly restricting access to asylum.
In the 1970s, the U.S. Government faced the overwhelming
arrival of unauthorized Haitians by boat. These Haitian boat people
fled the Duvalier dictatorship and arrived by the thousands on the
shores of Southern Florida. 10 The Haitian exodus was so massive that
President Carter created a special immigrant category for them and for
boat people from Cuba: the Cuban-Haitian Entrant Category. 11 Yet, the
category did not exist for long; the Florida Southern District Court
deemed it unlawful because it discriminated against Haitians on
account of their race and nationality. 12
In 1980, President Carter signed the Refugee Act into law. The
Refugee Act aligned U.S. immigration law with the United Nations’
1951 Refugee Convention. This led to the amendment of § 243(h)(1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 13—today, renumbered as
INA § 241(b)(3). 14 The amended version of then § 243 pertained to
“withholding” the removal of migrants deemed to be refugees as
defined in the Refugee Act 15 or, more specifically, those migrants who
could establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their

7

See id.
Id.
9
See generally IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SEND THEM BACK (2018).
10
See id. at 52.
11
ALISON MOUNTZ, THE DEATH OF ASYLUM: HIDDEN GEOGRAPHIES OF THE
ENFORCEMENT ARCHIPELAGO 41 (2020).
12
See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified
sub nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982); see also
STOTZKY, supra note 9, at 52-53 (discussing Civiletti).
13
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1996).
14
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2005).
15
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & DAVID B. THRONSON, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 1161 (7th ed. 2019).
8
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“race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion.” 16
Theoretically, the post-1980 version of INA § 243 expanded
protections for refugees by mirroring the Refugee Convention’s
principle of non-refoulement, or non-return, under Article 33. 17 The
principle of non-refoulement prohibits the return of refugees to
territories where their life or freedom would be endangered. 18
Notwithstanding, several cases in the early 1990s tested the protections
in INA § 243. 19
From late 1991 to early 1992, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals heard a series of cases concerning a class of interdicted
Haitians being held in Guantanamo, Cuba. Collectively, these cases
can be referred to as Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 20 or simply as
“the Baker cases.” Briefly stated, the Baker cases arose because the Bush
Administration was forcibly repatriating interdicted Haitians despite
the precarious political conditions in Haiti due to a military coup. 21
The Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (HRC) requested “that the court
enjoin [Secretary of State, James Baker III, and the other government
defendants] from forcefully repatriating Haitians not identified as
candidates for asylum until the implementation of procedures
providing adequate protection to Haitians pursuing political
asylum.” 22 The HRC asserted rights under “the First and Fifth
Amendments; an Executive Order; guidelines promulgated pursuant
to the Executive Order; the Refugee Act of 1980; the Immigration and
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; see United Nations
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (incorporating the provisions of the 1951 Convention but removing its
temporal and geographical restrictions) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
17
See 1951 Convention, supra note 16, at art. 33.
18
Id.
19
See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
[hereinafter Baker I]; Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.
1991) [hereinafter Baker III]; Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th
Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Baker VI].
20
See Baker I, 789 F. Supp. at 1552; Baker III, 949 F.2d at 1109; Baker VI, 953 F.2d
at 1498.
21
STOTZKY, supra note 9, at 145-159 (discussing the events giving rise to the Baker
cases).
22
Id. at 159.
16
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Nationality Act; the Administrative Procedure Act; and rules of
International Law . . . .” 23
After a series of back-and-forth litigations, granting and
reversing the HRC’s request for injunctive relief, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals ultimately held in the government’s favor. 24 The
court held, among other things, that the Haitians could not “avail
themselves of any judicially enforceable rights under [INA § 243(h)]”
because they had “not yet reached ‘a land border’ or a ‘port of entry.’
Therefore, their claims under the INA must fail.” 25 The HRC applied
for certiorari but was denied on February 24, 1992, thereby “giving the
government the authority to repatriate the Haitians, whatever the
consequences.” 26 Later, however, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve conflicting decisions between the Eleventh and
Second Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning interdicted Haitians and
INA § 243(h). 27 That case was Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 28
In Sale, the Supreme Court ruled that INA § 243(h) and
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention did not apply on the high seas. 29
Sale was a case about whether the U.S. Coast Guard could intercept
Haitian boat people from the high seas and forcibly repatriate them to
Haiti. 30 The majority held that the Coast Guard’s actions did not
violate § 243’s withholding-of-removal protections, nor did they
violate the obligation of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention. 31 However, Justice Blackmun filed a lone,
stinging dissent. 32
Nevertheless, the majority’s decision in Sale authorized the
U.S. Government to continue bending its duty of non-refoulement; the
decision made U.S. interdiction at sea a tool of “neo-refoulement.”
“Neo-refoulement” is a concept that refers to the strategic policies that
23

Id.
Baker VI, 953 F.2d at 1510.
25
Id.
26
STOTZKY, supra note 9, at 167.
27
See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1357 (2d Cir. 1992),
rev’d sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
28
Sale, 509 U.S. at 155.
29
Id. at 159.
30
See id. at 158.
31
Id. at 159.
32
See id. at 188 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24
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States parties to the Refugee Convention enact to evade their
international obligation of non-refoulement under Article 33. 33 One
such strategy is by preventing migrants from ever reaching, or
remaining within, sovereign territory. 34 The Baker cases and Sale
opened the door for other policies of neo-refoulement, such as the
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP).
The MPP, also known as the “Remain in Mexico” program,
forces asylum seekers arriving from Mexico to wait there for the
duration of their immigration proceedings. 35 Asylum seekers are sent
to dangerous border regions in Mexico where they are often targeted
by criminal cartels and are at risk of extreme violence. 36 They are
isolated away. For all intents and purposes, the southern border
regions are metaphorical islands for MPP enrollees. They are sent there
to create “physical, psychological, and legal distance” between them
and the public. 37 They are kept out of sight to be kept out of mind. As
a result, their access to a fair asylum adjudication process is severely
restricted.
This Note argues that the Baker 38 cases and Sale 39 paved the
way for the U.S. Government to use interdiction as a tool to evade its
obligation of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention and opened the door to the Migrant Protection Protocols
See Jennifer Hyndman & Alison Mountz, Another Brick in the Wall? Neo”Refoulement” and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe, 43 GOV’T
& OPPOSITION 249, 250 (2008); see also MOUNTZ, supra note 11, at 7 n.2.
34
See MOUNTZ, supra note 11, at 29.
35
Press Release, Dep’t Homeland Sec., Migrant Protection Protocols (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols
[hereinafter
DHS Press Release] (stating that certain asylum seekers are not subject to MPP,
including those who claim a fear of return to Mexico and unaccompanied alien
children).
36
Jonathan Blitzer, How the U.S. Asylum System Is Keeping Migrants at Risk in
YORKER
(Oct.
1,
2019),
Mexico,
NEW
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylum-system-is-keepingmigrants-at-risk-in-mexico.
37
Geoffrey Heeren, Distancing Refugees, 97 DENV. L. REV. 761, 761 (2020).
38
See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552, 1552 (S.D. Fla.
1991) [hereinafter Baker I]; Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1109
(11th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Baker III]; Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d
1498, 1498 (11th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Baker VI].
39
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158 (1993).
33
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program. It argues that both interdiction at sea and the MPP are used
as tools of neo-refoulement, which undermine international refugee
law and nullify the object and purpose of the Convention.
Additionally, both practices unjustly restrict access to asylum in the
U.S. 40
Section I provides a brief history of the origins and spirit of
refugee law. Section II discusses the Baker cases, which laid the
groundwork for enforcing U.S. interdiction and return practices.
Section III analyzes the majority’s reasoning in Sale, as well as Justice
Blackmun’s dissent. Section IV discusses how the MPP is the U.S.
Government’s latest tool of neo-refoulement. Finally, Section V briefly
discusses the MPP’s procedural history at the time of writing.
I:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF REFUGEE LAW
A. Origins of International Refugee Law

To understand the MPP’s impact on access to asylum, it is first
important to understand why and how modern refugee law
developed. It began at the international level. The concept of “asylum”
entered the international consciousness in the wake of World War II. 41
The United Nations (UN) recognized that the millions of people
displaced by the war needed protection. 42 The UN strived to
accomplish that through international cooperation. 43 In 1950, it
established the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). 44
The UNHCR has three multifaceted functions. First, it
promotes international agreements to protect refugees. 45 Second, it
works with governments to improve conditions within countries to
40
See STOTZKY, supra note 9, at 142 n.5 (discussing the United States’ commitment
to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states in Article
13 that “‘[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own….’ Article
14 states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution.’”).
41
See LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 15, at 1142-43.
42
Id. at 1144.
43
Id. at 1145.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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reduce the number of people requiring protection. 46 Lastly, the
UNHCR promotes admission of people requiring protection. 47 To
fulfill those humanitarian functions, the UNHCR adopted the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention). 48
Under the Convention, a “refugee” was a person who was
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin because of a
“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.” 49 The Convention’s original definition also included a
geographic and temporal limitation. Under Article I, a “refugee” was
a person who was outside her country of origin due to “events
occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.” 50 To address that
limitation, the UNHCR amended the Convention in 1967 through a
protocol. 51
The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol)
expanded the Convention’s “refugee” definition by removing the
Convention’s geographic and temporal limitations. 52 This left the
international community “with a more generic refugee agreement,”
one that provided universal coverage. 53 Despite this change, the
Protocol maintained the Convention’s fundamental principles of
“non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement.” 54 Among
these, the principle of non-refoulement is the Convention’s
cornerstone.
B. The Principle of Non-Refoulement
The term “non-refoulement” derives from the French word
“refouler,” which means to return or “[t]o repulse . . . to drive back, to

46

Id.
Id.
48
See 1951 Convention, supra note 16.
49
1951 Convention, supra note 16.
50
Id.
51
A “protocol” is “[a] treaty amending and supplementing another treaty.” Protocol,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION (5th ed. 2016).
52
1967 Protocol, supra note 16, at art. 1.
53
LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 15, at 1147.
54
1951 Convention, supra note 16, at 3.
47
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repel.” 55 Under Article 33 of the Convention, signatory States are
prohibited from returning a refugee “in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.” 56 The obligation of non-refoulement
is triggered when a migrant reaches the sovereign territory of a
signatory State. 57
Notwithstanding, contracting States have no obligation to
protect all refugees. States owe no duty of non-refoulement to those
“whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted .
. . of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country.” 58 In other words, the Convention “does
not . . . apply to all persons who might otherwise satisfy the definition
of a refugee in Article 1.” 59 That aside, the principle of nonrefoulement has become customary in international law.
Scholars of international law consider the principle of nonrefoulement to have “attained the normative value of jus cogens.” 60 In
international law, jus cogens, or “compelling law,” refers to a
hierarchically superior form of law considered to be above local or
national laws. 61 Norms of jus cogens are therefore peremptory, which
means that States are not allowed to enact laws that deviate from
them. 62 That is because jus cogens norms “are considered norms so
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting refouler, LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1981)).
56
1951 Convention, supra note 16, at art. 33.
57
See MOUNTZ, supra note 11, at 7 (“In a simple exclusionary equation, states use
geography strategically to undermine access to the rights accrued when a person lands
on sovereign territory, including the right to seek asylum.”).
58
1951 Convention, supra note 16, at art. 33.
59
Id. at 4.
60
Jean Allain, The jus cogens Nature of non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533,
533 (2001).
61
Amber Couzo, Asylum or Exile? A Look at How the Trump Administration Is
Changing U.S. Asylum Policies, 52 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 169, 198 (2021)
(citing Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the
U.N. Charter, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. REV. 72, 73 (2005)).
62
See Allain, supra note 60, at 534 n.3 (quoting Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which state, respectively, that “a peremptory norm
55
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essential to the international system that their breach places the very
existence of that system in question.” 63 The purpose of the Convention
is to shield people from persecution, not to deliver them to it. With that
in mind, it is easy to see why the principle of non-refoulement should
be considered jus cogens.
When contracting States enact policies that deviate from the
principle of non-refoulement, they undermine the object and purpose
of the Convention, thereby weakening the integrity of international
refugee law. Although jus cogens norms exist, as expressed in
Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 64 signatory States have enacted policies that bend the
principle of non-refoulement to its limit. One way they have done this
is through interdiction at sea. Interdiction refers to the act of
intercepting or seizing something, such as contraband, or someone,
such as an asylum seeker, at sea. 65 Interdiction is a tool of what border
scholars have called “neo-refoulement.”
II.

INTERDICTION AT SEA AS A TOOL OF NEO-REFOULEMENT

Neo-refoulement “refers to a geographically based strategy of
preventing the possibility of asylum through a new form of forced
return different from non-refoulement.” 66 It is a way for States parties
to the 1951 Refugee Convention to “evad[e] the legal obligation not to
return people to places where they may be at risk of harm.” 67
According to migration expert and geographer Alison Mountz, States
parties to the Convention use neo-refoulement strategies to regain
control over unauthorized and unexpected migration. 68 So, although
the United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968, simultaneously
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted,”
and that “[i]f a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”).
63
Id. at 535.
64
See id. at 534 n.3.
65
To “interdict” means to “intercept and seize (contraband, etc.).” Interdict, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION (5th ed. 2016).
66
Hyndman & Mountz, supra note 33.
67
MOUNTZ, supra note 11, at 247.
68
See id. at 33-34.
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binding it to the 1951 Convention, 69 it has used interdiction at sea as a
way to restrict access to asylum. One of the most notorious examples
of U.S. interdiction at sea traces back to the 1970s and involves
Haitians.
A. A Brief History of Haitian “Boat People”
In the 1970s, thousands of Haitians arrived in the United States
by boat. These “boat people” fled the dictatorship of Jean-Claude
“Baby Doc” Duvalier, who took over Haiti’s leadership after the death
of his father, François “Papa Doc” Duvalier. 70 In 1978, President Jimmy
Carter’s Administration created the “Haitian Program” in response to
the arrival of thousands of unauthorized Haitians by sea. 71 The Haitian
Program was designed to “process asylum claims and remove people
quickly and en masse, speeding up removal by denying parole once
people were detained through creation of an exceptional legal category
called the ‘Cuban-Haitian entrant category.’” 72
However, in 1980, the Southern District Court of Florida found
that the expeditious nature of the Cuban-Haitian entrant program
denied Haitian asylum seekers adequate review of their cases. 73 The
court also found that the program unlawfully discriminated against
Haitians because of their nationality and race, thereby denying their
rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 74 The court enjoined the Carter Administration from
removing the Haitian asylum seekers until the court approved of a
new asylum application procedure. 75 But before the court’s decision
See 1967 Protocol, supra note 16, at art. 1 (“The States Parties to the present
Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as
hereinafter defined.”).
70
See Carl Lindskoog, Violence and racism against Haitian migrants was never
limited to agents on horseback, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/10/02/violence-racism-againsthaitian-migrants-was-never-limited-horseback-riders.
71
MOUNTZ, supra note 11, at 40-41.
72
Id. at 41.
73
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 451-52 (S.D. Fla. 1980),
modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
74
Id. at 511; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
75
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 532-33.
69
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was announced, changes in U.S. refugee law had already been
developing.
In 1980, President Carter signed the Refugee Act (the Act) in
response to the “hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and
Cambodians [fleeing] political chaos and physical danger in their
homelands.” 76 The Act “raised the annual ceiling for refugees from
17,400 to 50,000” and authorized the intake of more in emergency
circumstances. 77 It also aligned U.S. immigration law with
international refugee law. For example, the Act modeled its definition
of “refugee” after the Convention, as amended by the Protocol. 78
Indeed, the Act adopted the international standard of “well-founded
fear of persecution” to determine refugee status. 79 However, a
significant difference between the Refugee Act and the Convention is
that the Act covers both noncitizens who have reached U.S. territory
and noncitizens who are still abroad. 80 Despite the 1980 Refugee Act’s
humanitarian promise, the U.S. Government restricted access to
asylum when President Reagan entered office. 81
When President Reagan entered office in 1981, the U.S.
Government’s approach to Haitian boat people changed. On
September 23, 1981, the U.S. and the Republic of Haiti agreed to allow
the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept vessels on the high seas and return
passengers to Haiti. 82 This was known as the U.S.-Haitian Interdiction
Program. The program’s purpose was to “intercept vessels engaged in
the illegal transportation of undocumented aliens to [U.S.] shores.” 83
The agreement included a non-penalization guarantee; that is, the
Haitian government promised not to punish the repatriated Haitians
for their illegal departure. 84 Furthermore, the U.S. Government agreed
to refrain from returning Haitians who qualified for refugee status. 85
Refugee Act of 1980, NAT’L ARCHIVES FOUND., https://www.archivesfoundation.org
/documents/refugee-act-1980 (last visited Oct. 20, 2022).
77
Id.
78
See LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 15, at 1149.
79
Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 76.
80
See LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 15, at 1145-49.
81
See 3 C.F.R. § 12324 (1981).
82
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 160 (1993).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
76
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Six days later, on September 29, 1981, President Reagan issued
Proclamation 4865, 86 “in which he characterized ‘the continuing illegal
migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens into the
southeastern United States’ as ‘a serious national problem detrimental
to the interests of the United States.’” 87 President Reagan then issued
Executive Order 12324, titled “Interdiction of Illegal Aliens,” to
suspend the entry of unauthorized migrants arriving by sea. 88 Reagan
“ordered the Coast Guard to intercept vessels carrying such aliens and
to return them to their point of origin,” except for Convention refugees
who did not consent to being returned. 89 Haitians intercepted at sea
were interviewed on Coast Guard cutter ships to determine if they
made a credible showing for refugee status. 90
In the asylum process, this initial interview is known as a
“credible fear” interview—the first screening threshold. Those
deemed to be economic migrants were “screened out” and returned to
their country of origin. 91 In contrast, those deemed to have shown a
credible fear of being returned to their country of origin were
“‘screened in’ and transported to the United States to file formal
applications for asylum.” 92 Notwithstanding the U.S.-Haitian
Interdiction Program and Reagan’s Executive Order, the Haitian
exodus continued into President George H.W. Bush’s term.
From October 1991 to April 1992, the U.S. Coast Guard had
interdicted over 34,000 Haitians. 93 Such high volumes made
processing on Coast Guard cutters unsafe. For that reason, the U.S.
Department of Defense opened the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo,
Cuba, for detention and processing of interdicted Haitians. 94
Regardless, the Haitian exodus continued by the thousands. By the
third week of May 1992, the Coast Guard had intercepted
approximately 10,497 undocumented migrants. 95 This overwhelmed
3 C.F.R. § 4865 (1981).
Sale, 509 U.S. at 160.
88
3 C.F.R. § 12324 (1981).
89
Sale, 509 U.S. at 160-61.
90
Id. at 161.
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Id.
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Id. at 161-62.
93
See id. at 163.
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95
Id.
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the facilities at Guantanamo and led the U.S. Navy to conclude “that
no additional migrants could safely be accommodated [there].” 96
The inability to safely screen interdicted Haitians at facilities in
Guantanamo, or onboard Coast Guard cutters, led President Bush to
issue Executive Order No. 12807 (Order 12807). 97 Order 12807 called
for the Coast Guard to forcibly repatriate Haitians interdicted on the
high seas without first determining whether they qualified as
refugees. 98 In international law, “high seas” refers to the “ocean waters
beyond the jurisdiction of any country.” 99 Thus, questions emerged
about the reach of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA) and of Article 33 of the Convention.
B. The Route to Sale: The Baker Cases
In September 1991, the Haitian military displaced Haiti’s first
democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 100 In the
weeks following the military coup in Haiti, the U.S. paused the forced
repatriation of interdicted Haitians. 101 However, forced repatriations
resumed by mid-November 1991. 102 This prompted the Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc. (HRC) to sue for injunctive relief to prevent the
U.S. Government from forcibly returning to Haiti interdicted Haitians
being held at Guantanamo. 103
In the Baker cases, the HRC first sought injunctive relief in the
Southern District Court of Florida. 104 The district court certified the
case as a class action. 105 The HRC asserted that the government “failed
to use minimally adequate procedures to ‘identify and protect’
Haitians fleeing the de facto government in Haiti, and that such actions
96

Id.
3 C.F.R. § 12807 (1992); see Sale, 509 U.S. at 163-66.
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Sale, 509 U.S. at 164 n.13.
99
High Seas, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION (5th ed. 2016).
100
JEFFREY S. KAHN, ISLANDS OF SOVEREIGNTY: HAITIAN MIGRATION AND THE
BORDERS OF EMPIRE 3 (2019).
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Sale, 509 U.S. at 162.
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Id.
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See id. at 163.
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Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
[hereinafter Baker I].
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violated” the U.S. Government’s non-refoulement obligation under
Article 33 of the Convention and Protocol. 106 Additionally, the HRC
claimed that the government violated § 243(h) of the INA, the
Administrative Procedure Act, the “HRC’s First Amendment rights to
speak with class members and potential members at Guantanamo,”
and the plaintiffs’ right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. 107
On December 3, 1991, Senior District Judge C. Clyde Atkins
entered a preliminary injunction against the government. 108 Judge
Atkins found that forcibly repatriating the interdicted Haitians being
held at Guantanamo would cause them “irreparable, even fatal, injury
if the injunction [was] not granted.” 109 The district court also found
that Immigration and Nationality Services (INS) officials had used
“substantially inadequate” procedures, which violated the INS’s own
guidelines when screening interdicted Haitians. 110 Finally, the “district
court held that the government’s actions violated Article 33 of the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and that the
HRC’s First Amendment rights had been violated by the government’s
total ban on HRC’s access to its clients.” 111 The government was
prohibited from repatriating interdicted Haitians “either until the
merits of the underlying action [were] resolved or until defendants
implement[ed] and follow[ed] procedures . . . adequate to ensure that
Haitians with bona fide political asylum claims [were] not forced to
return to Haiti in violation of Article 33 of the Protocol.” 112 The
government quickly appealed the injunction. 113
On December 17, 1991, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
dissolved the lower court’s injunction and remanded the case. 114 The
Eleventh Circuit held that Article 33 of the Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees is not a “self-executing” international agreement;
106
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108
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therefore, it does not apply to aliens who have not yet reached United
States territory. 115 “A ‘self-executing’ international agreement is one
that directly accords enforceable rights to persons without the benefit
of Congressional implementation.” 116 In simpler terms, U.S. courts
were not bound to enforce Article 33 of the Protocol absent legislative
implementation. As such, the Eleventh Circuit dissolved the Southern
District Court’s injunction and remanded the case with instructions. 117
On remand, the Southern District Court again granted
injunctive relief, 118 and again the government appealed. 119 On
February 4, 1992, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals “issued an
opinion vacating all injunctive orders by the district court and
remanded with instructions to dismiss the action because the
complaint ‘fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief c[ould] be
granted.’” 120 The HRC applied for certiorari, but the Supreme Court
denied their application on February 24, 1992. 121 Thus, the Baker cases
came to an end, but their legal questions were still open to debate.
On July 29, 1992, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary. 122 McNary was a case dealing
with virtually the same issues as the Baker cases, but in New York. The
McNary 123 court, however, held that the government’s forcible
repatriation of interdicted Haitians under Executive Order 12807 124
indeed violated INA § 243(h). 125 The Second Circuit disagreed with the
Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that interdicted Haitians could not assert
a claim based on § 243(h) because they had not reached U.S.
Baker III, 949 F.2d at 1110.
Id.
117
Id. at 1110-11; see also STOTZKY, supra note 9, at 161, 163 (discussing Judge
Hatchett’s dissenting opinion in Baker III).
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1083 (1992).
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territory. 126 The Second Circuit’s decision in McNary 127 therefore
created a split with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Baker VI. 128 On
June 21, 1993, however, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split
through its decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 129
III.

SALE V. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC.

In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc. 130 Sale was a case about the interdiction of Haitians on the
high seas by the U.S. Coast Guard under the auspices of President
Bush and his successor, President Bill Clinton. 131 There, the Court
decided whether the interdiction and forced repatriation of Haitians
under Order 12807 132 violated INA § 243(h)(1)—today, renumbered as
§ 241(b)(3). 133 It also decided whether the Order violated the United
States’ non-refoulement obligation under Article 33 of the
Convention. 134 Ultimately, the Court held that Order 12807 did not
violate either. 135
A. Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Sale, which seven
other justices joined. The Court held that Order 12807 violated neither
INA § 243(h)(1) nor Article 33 of the Convention; Justice Stevens
reasoned that neither had extraterritorial effect. 136 Simply put, refugee
protections under § 243(h)(1) and Article 33 of the Convention did not
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Id. at 1367–68.
128
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1525 (11th Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Baker VI].
129
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158 (1993).
130
Id.
131
See id. at 164-65.
132
3 C.F.R. § 12807 (1992).
133
See Sale, 509 U.S. at 158.
134
See id. at 159.
135
Id.
136
See id. at 183.
126
127

2022

FORECLOSING ASYLUM

167

apply beyond the United States’ geographic limits: 137 here, on the high
seas. The overarching reason was that Article 33 is not self-executing.
That means Congress needed to pass “subsequent implementing
legislation” for U.S. courts to enforce the duty of non-refoulement. 138
The Court explained by parsing out the language of both provisions.
1. The Distinctive Meaning in INA § 243(h)(1)
First, the Court interpreted the text of INA § 243(h)(1) (§ 243)
by looking at its legislative history. Before the 1980 Refugee Act, § 243
read as follows: “[t]he Attorney General is authorized to withhold
deportation of any alien . . . within the United States to any country in
which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion.” 139
After the Refugee Act passed, § 243 read as follows: “[t]he
Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if
the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 140 Both versions of INA § 243 protect refugees; however, the
Court read the post-1980 version to be more expansive. The Court
reasoned that “[b]y adding the word ‘return’ and removing the words
‘within the United States’ from § 243(h), Congress extended the
statute’s protection to both [deportable and excludable aliens].” 141
The words “deportable” and “excludable” describe aliens in
different situations. 142 On one hand, deportable aliens are in the

137
Id. at 176; see Extraterritorial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION (5th
ed. 2016) (“Occurring outside a particular state or country; beyond the geographic
limits of a particular jurisdiction.”).
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139
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Id. at 175-76.
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See also Wu v. Holder, 567 F.3d 888, 891-92 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that Sale
distinguished between “deportation” and “exclusion” proceedings, but that the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 “eliminated [that]
distinction . . . and replaced them with a unified ‘removal proceeding.’”).
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country and are subject to expulsion from the inside. 143 They are taken
from the inside and put outside. On the other hand, excludable aliens
are not in the country, but rather are at the country’s border and are
“ineligible for admission or entry” at that moment. 144 They are outside
and not allowed inside. The Court interpreted the word “return” in the
post-1980 version of the Refugee Act to apply to excludable aliens at the
border, not to deportable aliens in the country. 145 The Court reasoned
that any other interpretation would make the word “deport” in the
post-1980 version of § 243 unnecessary and redundant. 146
Moreover, the Court reasoned that Congress intended to
extend § 243’s protection to both deportable and excludable aliens
because it removed the phrase “within the United States” and added
the word “return.” It reasoned that removing the phrase “cured” the
geographic restriction that made § 243 applicable only to unauthorized
aliens already inside the country, and therefore subject to
deportation. 147
Notwithstanding the “extended” protection, the Court
concluded that § 243 did not have extraterritorial effect. According to
the Court, the 1980 amendment “did nothing to change the
presumption that both [deportable and excludable] aliens would
continue to be found only within [or at the threshold of] United States
territory.” 148 Here, the Court is relying on the presumption that “Acts
of Congress do not ordinarily apply outside [the United States’]
borders” unless such an intent is clearly manifested. 149 The statute’s
silence on that point therefore made the interdiction of Haitians on the
high seas legal under Executive Order No. 12807. 150

See Deportation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION (5th ed. 2016) (“The
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2. The Geographic Limitation in Article 33
Next, the Court turned to the text of Article 33 in the Refugee
Convention. Like with INA § 243, the majority concluded that
Article 33 was not meant to have extraterritorial effect. 151 To come to
that conclusion, the Court used the second paragraph in Article 33
(Article 33.2) to interpret the first paragraph (Article 33.1). As
discussed above, 152 Article 33 establishes the obligation of nonrefoulement. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits the return of
refugees “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.” 153 However, the Court reasoned that Article 33.2
restricts certain refugees from claiming the benefit of non-refoulement
in Article 33.1. 154
Article 33.2 states that the benefit of non-refoulement in
Article 33.1 “may not . . . be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted . . . of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country.” 155 Relying on the phrase “of the country in which he is,”
the Court concluded that the non-refoulement obligation under
Article 33.1 did not apply on the high seas. It reasoned that:
If the first paragraph did apply on the high seas, no
nation could invoke the second paragraph’s exception
with respect to an alien there: An alien intercepted on the
high seas is in no country at all. . . . It is more reasonable
to assume that the coverage of 33.2 was limited to those
already in the country because it was understood that
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33.1 obligated the signatory state only with respect to
aliens within its territory. 156
Put differently, the Court tells us that Articles 33.1 and 33.2
must be read together. Therefore, when Article 33.2 refers to a
refugee’s location, that is, “the country in which he is,” it is disqualifying
refugees located on the high seas because “an alien intercepted on the
high seas is in no country at all.” 157 According to the Court, interpreting
Article 33.1 as having extraterritorial effect would render pointless the
language of Article 33.2. It “would create an absurd anomaly” where
dangerous aliens on the high seas would be able to claim the benefit of
non-refoulement while dangerous aliens already in the country could
not. 158
Furthermore, the Court determined that Article 33’s use of the
term “refouler” applies to those aliens who are “merely ‘on the
threshold of initial entry.’” 159 In other words, the term refouler applies
to excludable aliens, not to deportable ones. As discussed above, 160
“excludable” aliens are those at the border who are ineligible for entry.
Meanwhile, “deportable” aliens are those who have entered the
country and are subject to removal from within. As such, the Court
interpreted Article 33’s use of refouler as “a defensive act of resistance
or exclusion at a border rather than an act of transporting someone to
a particular destination.” 161 Therefore, the duty of non-refoulement
under Article 33 is triggered only when an alien actually reaches
sovereign territory. “Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably
be read to say anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens
outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such actions.” 162
In sum, the majority in Sale determined that the silence of both
INA § 243(h)(1) and Article 33 regarding extraterritorial effect
prevented the Court from overruling the interdiction of Haitians on
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the high seas under Executive Order No. 12807. 163 All but Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Stevens’s majority opinion. 164 Blackmun filed
a dissenting opinion in which he challenged the majority’s “tortured”
reasoning. 165
B. Justice Blackmun’s Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent to Sale, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority’s
reasoning for ratifying Executive Order No. 12807. In his view, the
majority ruled the way it did because, to them, “the word ‘return’ does
not mean return . . . [and] because the opposite of ‘within the United
States’ is not outside the United States . . . .” 166 Blackmun first turned
his analysis to the language of Article 33. He argued that the language
of the Convention must be interpreted according to the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 167 The VCLT is an
authoritative guide on how international treaties should be
interpreted. 168 More specifically, Article 31 of the VCLT mandates that
“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.” 169 As Justice Blackmun saw
it, the majority did not interpret the phrase “return (‘refouler’)” based
on its ordinary meaning. 170
1. The Ordinary Meaning in Article 33
According to Blackmun, the “ordinary meaning of ‘return’ is
‘to bring, send, or put (a person or thing) back to or in a former
position.’” 171 To overcome the VCLT’s “ordinary meaning” mandate,
3 C.F.R. § 12807 (1992).
See Sale, 509 U.S. at 158.
165
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166
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countries must provide “extraordinarily strong contrary evidence” for
reading a treaty’s plain language differently. 172 Instead, the majority
interpreted the term refouler “almost entirely on the fact that American
law makes a general distinction between deportation and exclusion.” 173
As discussed above, 174 the majority in Sale argued that “[b]y
adding the word ‘return’ and removing the words ‘within the United
States’ from § 243(h),” Congress intended the phrase “return
(‘refouler’)” to apply exclusively to aliens at the border—that is,
excludable aliens. 175 Based on that understanding of congressional
intent, the majority argued that the distinction between deportation
and exclusion in American law therefore applied to the word “return”
as used in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention; Justice Blackmun
disagreed. 176
Blackmun responded by emphasizing that “the Convention
does not ban the ‘exclusion’ of aliens who have reached some
indeterminate ‘threshold’; it bans their ‘return.’” 177 What Blackmun
meant is that it should not matter where a refugee is seized “from.”
Rather, what matters for Article 33 purposes, is where a refugee is sent
“to.” In this case, the U.S. Coast Guard had “gone forth to seize aliens
who are not at its borders and return them to persecution.” 178 The
majority’s “strain to sanction that conduct” 179 required a “puzzling”
logical progression. 180
According to Blackmun, the majority’s reasoning began by
conceding that the ordinary meaning of refouler was “to repulse . . . to
drive back, to repel.” 181 So construed, the text of Article 33 would still
Id. at 194 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982)).
173
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describe what the Coast Guard was doing. The Coast Guard was
repulsing, driving back, and repelling interdicted Haitians to Haiti.
Notwithstanding, the majority claimed that to “return (‘refouler’)”
describes “a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather
than an act of transporting someone to a particular destination.” 182
With that in mind, Blackmun summarized the majority’s logical
progression as follows: “‘refouler’ means repel or drive back; therefore
‘return’ means only exclude at a border; therefore the treaty does not
apply [extraterritorially] . . . .” 183 Blackmun did not find that line of
reasoning satisfactory. 184
Next, Justice Blackmun turned to the majority’s discussion of
Article 33.2. Article 33.2 permits contracting States to return refugees
“whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted . . .
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community
of that country.” 185 Blackmun argued that Article 33.2’s geographic
limitation should not be mistaken as a geographic limitation on
Article 33 as a whole.
The object and purpose of the Refugee Convention is
expressed in Article 33.1, which does not include a geographic
limitation. 186 In contrast, Article 33.2 includes a geographic limitation
to allow States to deport criminal refugees illegally present in those
States. 187 Without that caveat, States may not have signed on to the
Convention to begin with. Blackmun recognized that. He also
recognized that projecting the geographic limitation in Article 33.2
onto Article 33.1 would defeat the object and purpose of Article 33 and
of the Convention: to protect people from persecution, wherever they
may be. Along the same lines, Blackmun rebutted the majority’s
projection of a geographic limitation onto INA § 243. 188
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2. No Geographic Limitation in § 243(h)(1)
As noted above, 189 the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted to
align the Immigration and Nationality Act with the international
Refugee Convention. Based on that purpose, Blackmun argued that
the majority inappropriately read a geographic limitation into INA
§ 243. Section 243(h)(1)—today § 241(b)(3)—permits withholding the
removal of refugees. 190 “Withholding of removal” is the phrase used
in U.S. immigration law to reflect the non-refoulement principle in
Article 33 of the Convention. 191 Blackmun explained that, because
Article 33.1 of the Convention forbids the return of refugees to
persecution regardless of where they are located, § 243 should also be
read to be “devoid of territorial restrictions.” 192
Moreover, Blackmun argued that the post-1980 version of INA
§ 243(h) does not have a geographic limitation because Congress did
not explicitly write one in when it could have done so. 193 To support
his reasoning, Blackmun looked at two other sections of the INA that
govern asylum: §§ 207 194 and 208. 195 Section 207 covers aliens who
make claims from overseas, 196 and § 208 covers aliens who make claims
when already “physically present in the United States or who arrive[] in
the United States” 197 at a land border or entry port. Congress explicitly
included geographic limitations in both of those sections, yet it
refrained from doing the same in § 243. Therefore, Blackmun found the
majority’s reading of a geographic limitation into § 243 “peculiar” at
best, and “puzzling” at worst. 198 “When Congress wanted a provision
to apply only to aliens ‘physically present in the United States, or at a
land border or port of entry,’ it said so.” 199
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Furthermore, Justice Blackmun argued that §§ 207, 208, and
243 were amended by the Refugee Act “to establish a comprehensive,
tripartite system for the protection of refugees fleeing persecution.” 200
One part of that system was to protect potential refugees overseas,
another for those physically present in the U.S. or at a border, and yet
another for those who are neither here nor there, but rather are simply
seeking protection. 201 Congress amended § 243 to reflect the principle
of non-refoulement. That is why “Congress (1) deleted the words
‘within the United States’; (2) barred the Government from
‘return[ing],’ as well as ‘deport[ing],’ alien refugees; and (3) made the
prohibition against return mandatory, thereby eliminating the
discretion of the Attorney General over such decisions.” 202 Reading a
geographic limitation into the post-1980 version of § 243(h) “restore[s]
the very language that Congress removed” and erodes the principle of
non-refoulement found in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. 203
All in all, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 204 had a
reverberating impact on access to asylum in the U.S. The majority in
Sale believed that Executive Order No. 12807 may have bent, but did
not break, the United States’ obligation of non-refoulement under the
Convention. However, as noted earlier, 205 the principle of nonrefoulement should be considered jus cogens—a hierarchically superior
form of law above local or national laws. That is, the principle of nonrefoulement is “so essential to the international system” of protecting
refugees that any deviation from it “places the very existence of that
system in question.” 206
The Court in Sale deviated from the principle of nonrefoulement and interdiction at sea continues to be U.S. policy. The
Court’s decision in Sale allows the U.S. to evade its international
obligation of non-refoulement under Article 33 by allowing the U.S.
Id. at 204.
See id. (“Unlike [§§ 207 and 208], however, which explicitly apply to persons
present in specific locations, the amended § 243(h) includes no such limiting language.
The basic prohibition against forced return to persecution applies simply to ‘any
alien.’”).
202
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Coast Guard to prevent migrants from getting near sovereign territory.
Interdiction at sea is a tool of “neo-refoulement.” Today, the U.S.
continues to bend the principle of non-refoulement in ways that
further restrict access to asylum. One of those ways is through the
Migrant Protection Protocols.
THE RIPPLE EFFECTS OF SALE: MIGRANT PROTECTION
IV.
PROTOCOLS
On January 24, 2019, the Trump Administration announced a
new policy that would impact asylum law. 207 The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) announced that it would begin
implementing “an unprecedented action that will address the urgent
humanitarian and security crisis at the Southern border.” 208 It was
referring to the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program, which is
informally known as the “Remain in Mexico” program. The MPP
severely impacts access to asylum in the U.S. A close look at the MPP’s
legal framework and its practical effects expose it as the U.S.
Government’s latest tool of neo-refoulement.
A. The MPP’s Legal Framework
The MPP is based on § 235(b)(2)(C) of the INA (§ 235). 209
Section 235 authorizes 210 the Secretary of DHS to return aliens to the
foreign contiguous territory from where they arrived on land for the
duration of their immigration proceedings. 211 The program applies to
aliens who make affirmative claims for asylum at the Southern border,

See DHS Press Release, supra note 35.
Id.
209
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C).
210
Compare Texas v. Biden, 554 F. Supp. 3d 818, 852 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (holding that
DHS’s decision to terminate MPP violated DHS’s “obligation[]” to return
inadmissible aliens to a contiguous territory under INA § 235 when DHS could not
meet its obligation to detain them), with Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528, 2541 (2022)
(holding that DHS has the “discretionary authority” to return aliens to a contiguous
territory, not a “mandatory” authority to do so should it be unable to meet its detention
obligations).
211
§ 1225(b)(2)(C); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a).
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outside of the U.S. 212 It also applies to aliens already present in the U.S.
illegally and who are apprehended near the border—which can mean
anywhere within 100 miles. 213 To make an “affirmative” asylum claim
means to request asylum without being prompted to by a U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol officer.
Notwithstanding, the MPP does not apply to Mexican asylum
seekers because returning them to Mexico would violate INA
§ 241(b)(3) 214—formerly known as INA § 243(h)(1). 215 It would also
blatantly violate the U.S.’s obligation of non-refoulement under the
Refugee Convention. 216 Aliens exempt from the program also include
unaccompanied alien children, aliens in expedited removal
proceedings, and others on a case-by-case basis. 217
Before the MPP, migrants who made an affirmative asylum
claim were referred to an asylum officer for a “credible fear”
interview. 218 This is otherwise known as a non-refoulement
interview. 219 “‘Credible fear’ of persecution means that there is a
significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of statements
and other factors, that the person could establish eligibility for
asylum.” 220 If the alien established a credible fear, they were entitled
to remain in the U.S. while their asylum case was adjudicated. 221 The
MPP changed that.
The MPP replaced the “credible fear” threshold with the “more
likely than not” threshold, which is a higher burden of proof for
asylum seekers to meet. Under the MPP, asylum seekers need to prove
that they will “more likely than not” face persecution if returned to

See DHS Press Release, supra note 35.
See generally Deborah Anthony, The U.S. Border Patrol’s Constitutional Erosion
in the “100-Mile Zone”, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 391 (2020).
214
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
215
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2020).
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Mexico. 222 This higher threshold makes it more difficult for eligible
asylum seekers to avoid MPP enrollment. This is clear considering that
nearly 70,000 people were returned to Mexico under the MPP from
January 2019 to December 2020 alone. 223
According to former Secretary of Homeland Security, Kirstjen
Nielsen, the MPP would curb mass unauthorized immigration. 224 DHS
also claimed that the “MPP [would] help restore a safe and orderly
immigration process” and increase migrants’ safety. 225 In a practical
sense, however, the program has put migrants in danger. MPP
enrollees are sent to border regions in Mexico that the U.S. Department
of State has “consider[ed] as hazardous as active-combat zones.” 226 As
of February 2021, “[a]t least 1,544 of these individuals were raped,
kidnapped, assaulted, tortured, or otherwise victimized.” 227 These
border regions serve as metaphorical “islands” where asylum seekers
must wait, away from the “mainland” where they seek refuge.
B. The MPP’s Island Logic
As described earlier, 228 neo-refoulement “refers to a
geographically based strategy of preventing the possibility of asylum
through a new form of forced return different from non-refoulement.” 229 It is a way for States to “evad[e] the legal obligation not to return
people to places where they may be at risk of harm.” 230 In that way,
States are able to evade their international obligation of non-return.
Interdiction at sea is a tool of neo-refoulement, as seen in the Baker
cases 231 and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 232
222
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Like interdiction in the Baker cases and Sale, the MPP bends the
principle of non-refoulement, thereby undermining international
refugee law. In those cases, the U.S. Government reached beyond its
borders to prevent Haitian boat people from reaching sovereign U.S.
territory where they would accrue the right to seek asylum.
Metaphorically speaking, the U.S. pushed its borders outward, beyond
its “fixed, earthbound core.” 233 This expansion pushed asylum seekers
back to Haiti or to offshore detention centers in Guantanamo. The MPP
continues that tradition by creating metaphorical islands out of the
border regions in Mexico where enrollees are sent.
Sending MPP enrollees to those regions has similar isolating
effects as if they were sent to actual islands. The MPP creates “physical,
psychological, and legal distance” between asylum seekers and the
public. 234 This distance severely impacts asylum seekers’ ability to
mount an effective case in U.S. immigration courts. For example, the
geographic distance alone creates a heavy logistical burden that
restricts effective access to legal counsel. Time and resources are
stretched thin. Hope is drained and spirits are tested as asylum seekers
navigate the MPP’s administrative waters. MPP enrollees are required
“to check in for their hearings in the middle of the night, make an
exhausting journey across the border [to a port of entry], wait for
several hours, and then spend only a few minutes presenting their
case—usually without the benefit of an attorney.” 235 This raises
important questions of procedural due process under the Fifth
Amendment as in the Baker cases.
Indeed, some have argued that the change from a “credible
fear” threshold to a “more likely than not” threshold creates issues of
procedural due process. 236 The higher threshold is the same burden of
proof as in regular removal proceedings, but with fewer procedural
safeguards. 237 For example, during regular removal proceedings,
aliens are allowed “a full evidentiary hearing before an immigration
KAHN, supra note 100, at 4.
Heeren, supra note 37.
235
Emily J. Johanson, The Migrant Protection Protocols: A Death Knell for Asylum,
11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 873, 897 (2021).
236
See generally Gambardella, supra note 221, at 996-97 (explaining how the “more
likely than not” burden of proof violates aliens’ due process rights).
237
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judge, notice of their rights, access to counsel, time to prepare, and
administrative and judicial review.” 238 Meanwhile, aliens subject to
the MPP must meet the same high burden of proof in an informal
interview with an asylum officer, not a judge, and without the
“opportunity to present witnesses or gather documentary
evidence.” 239 Furthermore, the asylum officer’s determination is not
subject to a judicial or other administrative review process. 240 Taking
that into consideration, it is easy to see how the MPP is adverse to the
spirit of the Refugee Convention.
“The [MPP] contradicts the purpose of asylum as a system that
allows people in danger to seek refuge by increasing the risk of
refoulement.” 241 It is no secret that the MPP puts asylum seekers at risk
of harm. 242 The Biden Administration recognizes that MPP enrollees
have been “subject[ed] to extreme violence and insecurity at the hands
of transnational criminal organizations that profited from putting
migrants in harms’ way while awaiting their court hearings in
Mexico.” 243 Yet, the Biden Administration expanded the program—
not by court order, but by its own choice. 244 Like being sent to an
island, MPP enrollees must practically fend for themselves in
dangerous border regions. They are isolated away to be forgotten.
In short, the MPP bends and eviscerates the principle of nonrefoulement. Like interdiction at sea in the Baker cases and in Sale, the
MPP creates distance between MPP enrollees and asylum. 245 It bends
the principle of non-refoulement to its limit and erodes the object and
purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Like interdiction at sea, the
MPP is a tool of neo-refoulement that further restricts access to asylum.
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CHALLENGING THE MPP

When President Biden entered office in 2021, he issued
Executive Order No. 14010 to have the new Secretary of Homeland
Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, review the MPP. 246 After his review,
Secretary Mayorkas determined that the MPP should be terminated
and issued a memorandum stating so on June 1, 2021 (June 1
Memorandum). 247 However, the states of Texas and Missouri sued the
Biden Administration in federal court to prevent the MPP’s
termination. 248
The states argued, among other things, that the June 1
Memorandum violated INA § 235. 249 The Northern District Court of
Texas found that, under § 235, DHS had the obligation to either return
inadmissible aliens to the foreign contiguous territory where they
came from, or else put them in mandatory detention. 250 When DHS
admitted it could not meet its obligation of mandatory detention, the
court reasoned that the only other option DHS had was to return the
aliens. 251 Therefore, when DHS decided to terminate the MPP, while
simultaneously being unable to meet its mandatory detention
obligation, DHS violated its obligations under § 235. In other words,
the court interpreted both INA § 235(b)(2)(C) (contiguous-territory
return authority) and § 235(b)(2)(A) (mandatory detention authority)
as duties. The court therefore granted injunctive relief against DHS by
vacating the June 1 Memorandum. 252 The MPP had to continue “in
good faith.” 253
Following the Northern District Court’s decision, DHS
reattempted to terminate the MPP. DHS appealed the district court’s
decision, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Texas

3 C.F.R. § 14010 (2021).
Texas v. Biden, 554 F. Supp. 3d 818, 828 (N.D. Tex. 2021), enforced in part, No.
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(5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Dec. 21, 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1098 (2022).
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court’s injunction. 254 The Supreme Court also denied DHS’s
application to stay the injunction. 255 On October 29, 2021, the Secretary
of DHS issued a new memorandum (October 29 Memorandum)
explaining the agency’s new reasoning for terminating the program. 256
Based on the October 29 Memorandum, DHS again appealed the Texas
injunction, but again the Fifth Circuit affirmed it. 257
On June 30, 2022, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the Texas injunction. 258 It disagreed with the Texas courts’ conclusion
that, among other things, DHS’s decision to terminate the MPP
violated INA § 235. 259 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court’s
opinion, reasoning that the contiguous-territory return authority given
to the DHS Secretary under INA § 235(b)(2)(C) was “discretionary—
and remains discretionary notwithstanding any violation of
[§ 235(b)(2)(A)].” 260 The Court reasoned that the plain language of
§ 235(b)(2)(C) states that the Secretary of DHS “may return the alien to
that territory pending a proceeding under section 1229a.” 261 The
“word ‘may’ clearly connotes discretion,” 262 therefore the North
District Court of Texas and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that the Secretary of DHS was obligated to return aliens to Mexico if
DHS could not meet its burden of mandatory detention pursuant to
§ 235(b)(2)(A). 263 In sum, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that
the Secretary of DHS has the discretionary authority to terminate the
MPP because DHS is not obligated to exercise its contiguous-territory
return authority as granted by § 235(b)(2)(C). 264 Following the
Texas v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538 (5th Cir. 2021).
See Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 926, 926 (2021).
256
See Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528, 2544-45 (2022).
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Supreme Court’s June 30th decision, 265 the Fifth Circuit court lifted
“the injunction that required DHS to reimplement the Migrant
Protection Protocols (MPP) in good faith.” 266
At the time of writing, the MPP seemed to be winding down. 267
In an August 8th press release, DHS confirmed that “[i]ndividuals are
no longer being newly enrolled into MPP, and individuals currently in
MPP in Mexico will be disenrolled when they return for their next
scheduled court date.” 268 As such, “[i]ndividuals disenrolled from
MPP will continue their removal proceedings in the United States.” 269
Despite its promise, the wind down process may still be subject to
interruption due to claims based on the Administrative Procedure Act
yet again 270 or perhaps on claims relating to Title 42 of the Public
Health Service Act. 271
The MPP, and practices like it, are contentious because they
raise important questions about the relationship between domestic
and international laws. Domestically, such practices raise questions
about the role the Legislature should, or must, play in all of this.
Globally, they raise questions about the balance between national
sovereignty and international obligations. No matter how those
questions are approached, what remains salient is that people will
continue to seek refuge and a better life in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees were created to protect the vulnerable. The principle of nonrefoulement is at the heart of both and is expressed in Article 33.
However, practices like interdiction at sea and the MPP breach norms
See generally id. at 2528.
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of international law. The MPP is a ripple effect of the Baker cases 272 and
Sale. 273 Like interdiction at sea, the MPP is a way for the U.S. to evade
its international obligations of non-refoulement. The MPP, and
practices like it, eviscerate the spirit of the Convention. They are tools
of neo-refoulement that unjustly restrict access to asylum in the U.S.
Advocates of due process should oppose such practices to ensure the
spirit of the Convention survives in U.S. refugee law.
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